Recent developments in health care have focused efforts on both the national and local levels to reduce unnecessary health care costs and the number of hospital stays while increasing the quality of care, particularly in the context of hospital-associated infections. Infectious diseases specialists who contract to oversee infectioncontrol and antibiotic-stewardship programs are uniquely positioned to play a pivotal role in helping hospitals to prosper in this new environment. This article will detail the available data supporting the value of infectious diseases specialists in their roles of directing antimicrobial-management and infection-control programs, maintaining health care workers' well-being, and minimizing exposure. The evidence in support of the influence of infectious diseases specialists to achieve cost-savings, decrease the length of hospital stays, and improve outcomes is robust and can be used as the framework for negotiating appropriate compensation from hospital management for these activities. Presenting this information in an amicable but definitive framework may be the linchpin to the overall success of the movement to improve quality of care while minimizing hospital costs and antimicrobial use. Developing this ability is critical to infectious diseases specialists' success as they redefine their role in the quality-of-care and risk-management arenas.
Over the past several years, as health care costs have skyrocketed, "value-based purchasing" has become a common catch phrase among public and private payers in their drive to reduce unnecessary health care costs and the number of hospital stays. The decision of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to not provide payment for certain hospital-acquired conditions, including 4 types of infection, is the most recent example of a payer's efforts to reduce unnecessary health care costs. Infectious diseases (ID) specialists who are contracted to oversee infection-control and antibioticstewardship programs are uniquely positioned to play a pivotal role in helping hospitals to prosper in this gence of multidrug-resistant organisms, and excessive strain on already limited pharmacy budgets, is one in which the ID specialist plays a central role. Several approaches, including programs of concurrent review and focused intervention to switch and streamline antimicrobial use and the development of clinical practice guidelines, have been studied and shown to be successful. Although clinical practice guidelines have been developed by the Infectious Diseases Society of America, implementation of these guidelines must be adapted to the individual hospital. To optimize appropriate guideline adaptation at the local level, antibiogram data, drug formularies, and ability to implement guideline adherence protocols must be taken into account. ID specialists are uniquely qualified to direct and conduct these efforts, both at a programmatic and concurrentreview level that will ensure the success of antimicrobial-management programs. Successful programs are generally able to achieve desirable outcomes, such as overall cost-savings, decreased use of inappropriate antibiotics, reduced length of hospital stay, and reduced antibiotic resistance. As an example, Carling et al. [3] instituted a concurrent-review program at a 174-bed community hospital that achieved ∼$250,000 in annual cost-savings while concomitantly reducing the prevalence of nosocomial infection due to Clostridium difficile and drugresistant Enterobacteriaceae. Cost-savings are typically greatest during the early phases of such programs, and other desirable outcomes require continued supervision and management by ID specialists. References that quantify the results of some ID specialist-directed interventions are presented in table 1.
THE VALUE OF AN ID SPECIALIST-DIRECTED INFECTION-CONTROL PROGRAM (ISCP)
It is an ID specialist's decisions and influence with other health care providers and administrators that determine the success of an infection-control program. The Study on the Efficacy of Nosocomial Infection Control, which was initiated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the 1970s, demonstrated that active infection-surveillance and -control programs reduced nosocomial infection rates by 32% [18] . A more recent Centers for Disease Control and Prevention-generated surveillance study (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) ) demonstrated a 44% decrease in the number of bloodstream infections in medical intensive care units when appropriate measures were instituted [19] . The excess direct hospital cost is an average of $15,275 per each nosocomial infection, with collateral costs totaling an estimated $38,600 [20, 21] . Nationwide, 5% of patients hospitalized in the United States acquire nosocomial infections [18] . Although this rate will vary depending on such characteristics as hospital size, location, and teaching status of the institution, the costsavings resulting from a basic ISCP, as outlined by the Study on the Efficacy of Nosocomial Infection Control, is staggering.
The increasing reluctance of public and private payers to reimburse for health care-associated conditions suggests that reduced nosocomial infection rates and shorter hospital stays will be critical to achieving cost-savings in the future (table 2) . A qualified ID specialist is in the best position to realize and quantify these cost-savings for the hospital. The 2 following complementary approaches to quantifying cost-savings resulting from an ISCP may be used: comparison of rates of health care-associated infections with published national statistics and longitudinal evaluation of specific facilityassociated rates. The latter is particularly important when instituting changes in procedures or equipment used or when assessing the impact of educational initiatives.
COMPARING RATES OF HEALTH CARE-ACQUIRED INFECTIONS WITH PUBLISHED NATIONAL STATISTICS
From 1992 through 2004, the National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance System collected data regarding target infections (e.g., ventilator-associated pneumonia, central line-associated bloodstream infections, and catheter-related urinary tract infections) from participating tertiary care hospitals. The system was reorganized in 2005 under the National Health and Safety Network (NHSN), and 211 hospitals reported rates from 2006 for the first summary [27] . The majority of NHSN hospitals are teaching hospitals with 1200 beds; thus, larger tertiary care hospitals may find relevance when benchmarking rates with NHSN data. For community hospitals of smaller size, benchmarking with NHSN data could pose limitations because of major differences in hospital size, patient mix, and severity of illness.
An ID specialist is critical to evaluating such published statistics and their relevance to individual hospitals. Smaller networks of hospitals can provide relevant information when reporting standards and monitoring are uniform. However, such networks are generally not available, except for the Duke Infection Control Outreach Network (established in 1997), which comprises 39 hospitals and confidentially reports rates of device-related infection and surgical-site infection and other pertinent data. Favorable reductions in the rates of nosocomial bloodstream infection (23% reduction), nosocomial methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infection and colonization (22%), and ventilator-associated pneumonia (40%) yielded potential savings of $578,307-$2,195,954 per year at 12 community hospitals; the median size of these hospitals was 198.5 beds (range, 27-537 beds) [28] .
The value that an ID specialist adds to a robust monitoring and guideline-driven ISCP with only nonphysician infectioncontrol practitioners may be questioned. Remarkably, in a large tertiary care hospital, 380 (69%) of 549 study patients received inappropriate therapy within the 24-h period after culture of a sample from a sterile site was found to be positive for MRSA. 
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Not studied Stogsdill et al. [8] and Modjtabai et al. [9] [26] are beginning to take steps that would eliminate hospital payments for 28 "never events" endorsed by the National Quality Forum. Although nosocomial infections are not included in the initial National Quality Forum list of 28 "never events," they may be added in the future. CABG, coronary artery bypass grafting.
In-hospital mortality was statistically significantly higher among patients who received inappropriate initial antimicrobial therapy within 24 h after a positive culture result was determined than among those who received appropriate initial therapy (26.1% vs. 16.6%;
) [29] . These authors recently dem-P p .015 onstrated that patients who received appropriate initial antibiotic therapy for MRSA infection had a median length of hospital stay that was 2 days shorter than that for those who were given inappropriate initial antibiotic therapy (7.1 vs. 9.3 days;
); the median cost for patients who received P p .050 appropriate treatment was $13,688, compared with $19,427 for those who received inappropriate treatment ( ) [30] . A P p .019 multicenter study involving 1 tertiary care and 8 community hospitals found that only 44.2% of patients who received a diagnosis of surgical-site infection due to MRSA and only 38.3% of patients who received a diagnosis of MRSA bacteremia received appropriate therapy within 24 h after culture was performed; only 73.6% and 67.9%, respectively, received appropriate therapy within 7 days after culture [31] . These studies demonstrate that guidelines and ISCPs alone clearly are not sufficient. ID consultation (either voluntary or mandatory) improves the care and outcome for patients with S. aureus bacteremia [2, 32] . ID specialists are uniquely qualified, by virtue of their training and ability to interact with patients and providers at the bedside, to address and solve these complex problems.
An ID specialist-directed ISCP can be instrumental in advising community hospitals on appropriate benchmarking, such as with the NHSN, the Duke Infection Control Outreach Network, or possibly other networks. However, caution is advised regarding connecting payment for ID physician ISCP services to success against benchmarks, because individual hospitals with emerging programs and limited personnel may not have the ability to calculate such success consistently.
LONGITUDINAL EVALUATION WITHIN A SPECIFIC FACILITY
The longitudinal evaluation approach to cost-savings is potentially very influential, because the data is collected from and pertains to the specific health care facility. A team approach is essential to the success of both implementation and data collection. The approach involves obtaining data on the rate of a specific infection, instituting a change, and measuring the outcome. Cost-savings may be calculated by multiplying the amount of decrease in the infection rate by the published cost of each occurrence of the monitored infection. An increasing number of states are requiring such data collection focused on specific infections, such as infection that occurs after cardiac or joint replacement surgery, infection due to drug-resistant organisms, and catheter-related bloodstream infections. As these data collection efforts expand, a longitudinal approach may become the preferred way to quantify cost-savings, especially for smaller community hospitals. Table 3 provides a list of studies examining infection-control interventions and their impact on morbidity and health care costs. Effort has been made to cite well-controlled studies when available. To ensure consistency and relevance, all studies cited that have quantified costs were conducted in the United States.
THE VALUE OF AN ID SPECIALIST IN MANAGING HEALTH CARE WORKER (HCW) WELL-BEING AND EXPOSURES
An underappreciated aspect in which an ID specialist can prove to be invaluable to a hospital is the active prevention of transmission of communicable diseases and the management of outbreaks of disease among HCWs. An ID specialist can assist in the identification of appropriate immunization programs, champion their implementation, and direct early identification of potential HCW-related outbreaks of infection. Effective ef-forts with regard to these actions can benefit the hospital by both minimizing missed days of work and decreasing the length of hospital stay attributable to nosocomially acquired communicable diseases. A recent example of the central role of an ID specialist is found in the evaluation and control of an outbreak of norovirus infection that occurred from February through May 2004 in a 946-bed tertiary care hospital [77] . After being notified of 2 cases of acute gastroenteritis in HCWs in the coronary care unit, the hospital epidemiology and infection-control team initiated active surveillance, because community outbreaks of norovirus infection had recently been identified. After identifying cases in both patients and HCWs clustered in the coronary care and psychiatry units, aggressive infection-control measures terminated the outbreak. Costs associated with this outbreak were conservatively estimated to be $657,644. Prompt recognition of the risk of norovirus infection in the community and implementation of infection-control measures under the direction of ID specialists was essential in limiting the morbidity and costs associated with the outbreak. An ID specialist can also help the hospital to comply with state and federal immunization mandates in a cost-effective and rational way. Table 4 summarizes studies pertaining to the health of HCWs.
PUTTING THE DATA TO USE EFFECTIVELY IN A NEGOTIATION
Reviewing and understanding the available data demonstrating the essential role of ID specialists in generating cost-savings while effectively improving infection control and quality of care in the hospital setting is critical. Subsequently, a plan must be generated to help achieve the goals of the pending negotiation. This can be organized in many ways and serves to delineate the presence or absence of leverage in the negotiation process. Although a leveraged position should never be used to force a negotiating partner into a contractual relationship, it helps to define negotiation parameters. After preparing to negotiate, an ID specialist must organize and practice his or her presentation. This preparation allows the ID specialist an opportunity to define strengths and weaknesses and to structure a presentation using inoffensive verbiage. The presentation can then be delivered in an amicable manner.
Internal preparation. Internal preparation is the initial organizational step toward negotiation and is summarized in table 5. In this exercise, the focus is on the needs and wants of the ID specialist, as well as the costs of the program, ignoring all interests of the negotiating partners. First, the ID specialist's needs must be objectively defined, and an extensive list must be generated so that all issues are considered. Examples include a need for increased revenue to support a new employee, the need to control intrahospital spread of MRSA infection, the need to minimize the use of a particular antimicrobial agent, the need to expand the ID specialist's office to accommodate outpatient antibiotic therapy, and the need to decrease needle sticks.
Next, the ID specialist's wants should be delineated as morespecific actions or items that can be objectively articulated. For example, although the ID specialist needs to minimize the use of a particular antimicrobial agent, he or she wants to hire a clinical pharmacist to help accomplish this goal. Each need can and should be accompanied by у1 wants during the preparation phase.
Subsequently, the ID specialist must identify, list, and understand the costs, organized into present costs, costs of inaction, and costs of definitive action. Present costs are those costs actually incurred during the present time, and these costs would theoretically continue to accrue. Costs of inaction are the incremental costs of not obtaining what is sought. In contrast, inaction may translate into costs that will be exponentially greater in the future without definitive action. Lastly, the costs of definitive action are the incremental costs realized if the goal is achieved. These costs can be elusive and, therefore, are critical to understand when deciding how to proceed with a negotiation. For example, the cost of inappropriate antibiotic prescribing may be $100,000 (the present cost). If no action is taken, this may be prorated into a deficit of $200,000 over the subsequent 12 months (the cost of inaction). If a clinical pharmacist is hired, the incremental cost (the cost of definitive action) may be only $80,000. Potential savings should also be layered into the latter analysis, which could theoretically decrease the cost of definitive action to $0. Clearly, any analysis that can project the overall cost of definitive action as a negative number (and, thus, actual profit) is eminently more saleable and makes any discussion easier.
Finally, the aforementioned data should be reviewed in light of alternative approaches to negotiating an agreement. For example, an alternative approach could be to restrict a particular antibiotic agent, mandate infectious diseases consultation for certain diagnoses, or use available clinical staff for the same program rather than hiring a new pharmacist. This process is known as delineating the best alternative to negotiating an agreement (BATNA) [101] . Structuring a BATNA is very helpful for a number of reasons. First, it allows for an understanding of the options if the negotiation is unsuccessful. If the option is unpalatable, the ID specialist should perhaps "soften" the presentation, be willing to accept less than what is considered to be reasonable, or seek assistance in strengthening an alternative. Second, if the BATNA is strong, the opposite is true, and the ID specialist may consider asking for concessions, increasing the financial request, or exercising the alternative option and foregoing the negotiation completely.
External preparation. External preparation, almost by definition, is more difficult to obtain and define than is internal preparation. External preparation can be divided into 4 discrete activities. First, the ID specialist should attempt to define the needs of his or her negotiating partner. Although this is clearly subject to error, frequently a negotiating partner, restricted by historical failure, authoritarian edicts, or lack of budgetary creativity, may not perceive an apparent need. An example would be a mid-level hospital manager who has been directed to freeze the hiring of all additional clinical personnel. If antimicrobial use appears to be within budgetary constraints, no need may be perceived. Delineation of the anticipated and incremental expenditures and the defined cost-savings that are inherent in the procurement of a clinical pharmacist or a proactive concurrent antimicrobial-management program may be helpful. Another frequently overlooked hospital need is the informal or formal marketing that can occur when infection rates are lowered, less patients experience hospital-acquired infections, and overall patient satisfaction improves.
Second, it is critical to review past obstructions to success. Regardless of personal history with a negotiating partner, it is helpful to understand why a decision, contract, negotiation, or recruitment was rejected in the past. Frequently, the answer is financial. This can only be alleviated by displaying potential cost-savings of activity or potential loss of money or clinical capability through inactivity. The latter refers to the clinical expert being unable or unwilling to continue to provide service unless the action takes place. It is highly recommended that an individual ID specialist possess a very strong BATNA before beginning negotiations. Another reason for past failures is the belief of many organizations that prior regulatory compliance makes future citations unlikely; this is based on subjective feelings and is void of objective data.
Third, the ID specialist should attempt to delineate his or her negotiating partner's BATNA. Although this is usually difficult and subjective, it is helpful when evaluating the likelihood of a successful negotiation. If the ID specialist believes that his or her negotiating partner's BATNA is to disband the antibioticuse committee, to displace him or her as the ID specialist in charge, or to perform any other profoundly negative action, the ID specialist's BATNA and subsequent approach to a resolution of the problem at hand may need to be revised. On Table 4 . Results of studies on infection control and health care workers (HCWs). the other hand, if the partner's BATNA is weak, an ID specialist may feel more comfortable requesting that the contract include preferential reimbursement.
Lastly, fair market value (FMV) for the service under discussion needs to be established. FMV is a term used in both law and accounting that usually refers to the amount a person would pay for a piece of property. FMV has been extrapolated to the medical profession and has been used when referring to ID specialist services. FMV is used in virtually every contract discussion, is frequently misunderstood, and is sometimes presented by a hospital administrator as the sole reason that a contract cannot be negotiated for a larger financial sum. This "valuation" discussion is usually very subjective and based on opinion or budgetary constraints. In reality, the value of a service provided by an expert (specialist) to a prospective buyer (hospital) is directly related to the need and perceived value of the service in terms of monetary and nonmonetary gain. For example, what is a reasonable and "fair market" cost for an infection-control and antibiotic-stewardship program that minimizes hospital expenditures, maximizes patient outcomes, and favorably restructures the risk/benefit analysis of hiring an ID physician? Although poorly defined, based on the previous analysis, the amount is in excess of what most hospitals or systems are willing to pay. The FMV should be defined locally, because living expenses, reimbursement, and the cost of delivering medical care vary by region. The income that the ID specialist would generate if he or she performed an alternative activity on behalf of a hospital during work hours would need to be considered in the FMV. Obtaining information on an FMV can be difficult. Calling ID physicians in the area or region and using compiled Infectious Diseases Society of America data can help to generate an objective list of contractual stipends that other ID specialists have negotiated for similar services. Generic organizations that compile data on various medical subspecialties are not as accurate, because the data are frequently based on a national average and are poorly extrapolated to an individual region.
Making the case for a global fee instead of an hourly payment rate. ID consultants can be reimbursed at an hourly rate or retained for a global fee. Unlike the hourly payment rate reimbursement model, the global fee is developed on the basis of an estimate of time necessary to do the specified work. The ID specialist can then be retained for this global fee with a clear understanding by the health care facility of the work that they are to receive for a set fee. This avoids the unpleasant activity of punching a time clock.
For example, an ID specialist might estimate that his or her consultative work related to infection control would require 5 h per week at a cost of $250 per h. In this instance, a retainage agreement could be developed that states that the global fee for these services is $65,000 per year, based on the estimate of $250 per h multiplied by 5 h per week. The agreement should outline the services expected (i.e., antibiotic stewardship, patient and employee safety, outbreak management, surveillance, and microbiology laboratory use). Payment for work outside the scope of the retainage agreement would be given at an agreed hourly rate.
To provide justification for the global fee, an annual report on accountability and results should be submitted to the hospital administration. This should include easily identifiable metrics (e.g., rates of antibiotic use, surgical-site infection, contaminated blood culture, and employee vaccination and resultant cost-savings) that can be used to document the ID specialist's activity. These metrics, if organized into a short and readily understandable report, should enable ID consultants to aggressively demonstrate the value of their services. The recent implementation of the Stark Regulations prohibits incentivebased payments to medical directors [102] .
Presentation. The aforementioned preparation will be of little value if the presentation of the information is not polished. The presenting specialist need only remember how often patients value the opinions of physicians who are not clinically insightful but who possess a bedside manner that breeds confidence and comfort. The presentation can be dissected into the 3 following objective segments: demonstrate need, articulate value, and delineate reasonable reimbursement.
All presentations should begin with a demonstration of the need for a change. If the negotiating partner is aware of this, the ID specialist may not need to negotiate. Alternatively, the negotiating partner may be aware and may have chosen to ignore the potential problem. Verbiage is critical and can greatly influence the likelihood of success. For example, any comments inferring that the negotiating partner is incompetent or indifferent to the situation at hand will bring the meeting to a premature closure. Phrases such as "I'm sure we are both concerned with the rising costs of antibiotic use for conditions, such as ventilator-associated pneumonia and central line-related sepsis" are healthy and invite agreement and discussion. In contrast, a statement such as "You must have been aware of this need for years" implies deceit, dishonesty, stupidity, or lack of interest. Although the statement may be factual, it can attain no benefit.
Next, the ID specialist must objectively articulate his or her value in achieving the goal under discussion. ID specialists are not selling their presence or stature; they are selling medical leadership. This is an active process that can be delineated [2] . With use of the aforementioned data, a model can be generated to demonstrate the opportunity available. An ID specialist's ability to restructure physician behavior is a major selling point that cannot be refuted.
Lastly, the ID specialist must present the financial value of the contract. Prospectively defining what is reasonably paid for similar services in the region (i.e., the FMV) is helpful, because it provides objective data. In the absence of or in conjunction with these data, outside regulatory guidelines may come into play. Recently, the Office of the Inspector General rescinded guidelines limiting the hourly rate available for ID specialist contracts. It may be of value to ask a health care attorney whether any such state-specific restrictions apply before the negotiation.
To some extent, the FMV and regulatory restrictions can be overcome with use of the 2 following parameters: experience with historical positive outcomes and a strong BATNA. If an ID specialist has experience with similar activities or contracts, he or she can demand preferential reimbursement. This approach is bolstered by objective data demonstrating success with previous ventures and predicting success for the future. Second, a strong BATNA helps delineate the negotiation landscape. A strong BATNA may actually limit negotiation verbiage, because anything less than the best alternative should not be accepted. Of course, with every guideline comes exceptions. One reason to accept less than the BATNA would be that the contract provides support for other positions. For example, a less than lucrative contract for infection-control services may help cement relationships, allowing for growth or stability in the clinical consultation practice. Assessment of the combined anticipated revenues may be more beneficial than assessment of individual revenues.
SUMMARY
The need for physician expertise and intervention has never been more apparent than at the present time. With increasing financial pressures being levied by Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and third party insurers, hospitals are forced to optimize the use of their revenue. Numerous studies delineate the available data and exist as a framework for programmatic development or improvement. The opportunity for ID physicians is to extract and articulate the appropriate data in an effort to display their capabilities and competencies. Presenting this information in an amicable but definitive framework may be the linchpin to the overall success of the movement to improve quality of care while optimizing hospital costs and antibiotic use. Developing this ability is critical to physicians' success as they redefine their role in the quality-of-care and risk-management arenas.
